Path to judicial activism? The use of “relevant rules of international law” by the WTO Appellate Body by de Andrade, Mariana Clara
Path to judicial activism? The use 
of “relevant rules of international 
law” by the WTO Appellate Body
Porta para ativismo judicial? O 
uso de “regras pertinentes de 
direito internacional” pelo Órgão 
de Apelação da OMC
Mariana Clara de Andrade
Sumário
I. DossIê EspEcIal:  HIstory of IntErnatIonal law ......................................1
EDItorIal  ......................................................................................................................... 8
What does it mean to apply history in international law studies? ........................................................ 8
Arthur Roberto Capella Giannattasio
sur la naturE Du DroIt IslamIquE ..................................................................................14
Hocine Benkheira
IslamIc sHarI’a law, HIstory anD moDErnIty: somE rEflEctIons ................................25
Suleiman A. Mourad 
tHE (un)practIcal sEcularIzatIon procEss: IntErnatIonal law anD rElIgIon as so-
cIal rEalItIEs ...................................................................................................................33
Douglas de Castro
BrazIlIan lItEraturE on IntErnatIonal law DurIng tHE EmpIrE rEgImE. or tHE DIffusIon 
of IntErnatIonal law In tHE pErIpHErIEs tHrougH approprIatIon anD aDaptatIon ............. 50
Airton Ribeiro da Silva Júnior
natural, posItIvo, romano E unIvErsal? InvEstIgação soBrE o DIrEIto Das gEntEs Em 
tomás DE aquIno .............................................................................................................68
Rafael Zelesco Barretto
II. artIgos soBrE outros tEmas ....................................................................97
vInculação Dos DIrEItos EconômIcos, socIaIs E culturaIs: uma DIscussão Do DEsEnvolvI-
mEnto Humano com BasE no concEIto DE amartya sEn soBrE o mínImo ExIstEncIal.....99
Natalia Mascarenhas Simões Bentes e Yasmim Salgado Santa Brígida
a nova lEI DE mIgração E a protEção confErIDa ao apátrIDa: alInHamEnto BrasIlEIro 
ao paDrão IntErnacIonal DE DIrEItos Humanos ............................................................ 122
Pedro Henrique de Faria Barbosa e Sylvio Loreto
E sE o suprEmo trIBunal fEDEral (stf) rEstaBElEcEr a vIgêncIa Da convEnção n. 158 
Da organIzação IntErnacIonal Do traBalHo (oIt) na orDEm juríDIca BrasIlEIra? so-
BrE uma possívEl rEvIravolta, pEla vIa Do DIrEIto IntErnacIonal, Das lEIs traBalHIstas 
BrasIlEIras ...................................................................................................................... 138
Daniel Damasio Borges
julgaDos Da cortE IntEramErIcana soBrE casos BrasIlEIros E polítIcas púBlIcas: rEflE-
xõEs acErca DE possívEIs InfluIçõEs ............................................................................... 165
Rafael Osvaldo Machado Moura
crEatIng BrIDgEs BEtwEEn IntErnatIonal rElatIons tHEory anD IntErnatIonal Human 
rIgHts law: constructIvIsm anD tHE rolE of BrazIl In tHE IntEr-amErIcan systEm of 
Human rIgHts ................................................................................................................. 179
Ismael Francisco de Souza, Luciana Rocha Leme e Erick da Luz Scherf 
justIça DE transIção na argEntIna E o sIstEma IntEramErIcano DE DIrEItos Humanos: 
uma análIsE Do caso luIs muIña (“rEgra 2x1”) ............................................................ 199
Emilio Peluso Neder Meyer e Jessica Holl
a lEgalIDaDE E lEgItImIDaDE Da IntErvEnção HumanItárIa: uma mEDIDa aInDa nEcEssárIa .219
Natália Caye Batalha Boeira
o acorDo DE Escazú E o acEsso à Informação amBIEntal no BrasIl............................252
Érica Bezerra Queiroz Ribeiro e Bruno Amaral Machado
Dos povos natIvos ao surgImEnto Dos movImEntos socIaIs: InfluêncIas Dos DIscursos juríDIcos, 
rElIgIosos E méDIcos para a construção Do concEIto DE HomossExualIDaDE no BrasIl .............267
Bruno Rafael Silva Nogueira Barbosa e Robson Antão de Medeiros
aspEctos juríDIcos Da partIcIpação Da unIão EuropEIa na omc: comprEEnDEnDo sutI-
lEzas DE um DElIcaDo EnlacE ......................................................................................... 291
Camilla Capucio
patH to juDIcIal actIvIsm? tHE usE of “rElEvant rulEs of IntErnatIonal law” By tHE 
wto appEllatE BoDy ...................................................................................................307
Mariana Clara de Andrade
lEvEza E pEso na mEDIação comErcIal IntErnacIonal: o contEúDo juríDIco Do acorDo 
corporatIvo mEDIaDo E sua Incorporação pElo DIrEIto BrasIlEIro .............................324
Henrique Lenon Farias Guedes
jurIsDIção IntErnacIonal E as DIfIculDaDEs DE ExEcução DE sEntEnças IntErnacIonaIs 
no BrasIl ........................................................................................................................344
Nevitton Vieira Souza 
o DEvEr DE coopEração nos contratos DE vEnDa IntErnacIonal DE mErcaDorIas: prEs-
supostos tEórIcos E rEpErcussõEs prátIcas Da cláusula gEral Da Boa-fé oBjEtIva para a 
aplIcação Da cIsg .........................................................................................................358
Angelo Gamba Prata de Carvalho
a DImEnsão juríDIca Do ImpErIalIsmo na (DEs)orDEm gloBal capItalIsta: uma análIsE com 
BasE na crítIca marxIsta ao DIrEIto IntErnacIonal E às rElaçõEs polítIco-EconômIcas 
DE DomInação E DEpEnDêncIa.........................................................................................380
Thomaz Delgado De David, Maria Beatriz Oliveira da Silva e Rosane Beatris Mariano da Rocha Barcellos Terra
a partIcIpação DE BrasIl E EstaDos unIDos na formulação Das rEgras multIlatEraIs Do 
comércIo agrícola .........................................................................................................402
Vera Thorstensen, Vivian Daniele Rocha Gabriel e Alebe Linhares Mesquita 
a galáxIa lEx E a construção DE um sIstEma juríDIco transnacIonal .......................... 441
Eugênia Cristina Nilsen Ribeiro Barza e Jéssyka Maria Nunes Galvão
Has tHE aBIlIty of trutH commIssIons to rEcommEnD amnEsty BEEn EffEctIvE In 
EnHancIng pErpEtrator coopEratIon?   .....................................................................453
Jeremy Sarkin
a concEptual papEr on tHE polIcy-framEwork tHat mIrrors tHE DynamIc lInk BEtwEEn 
Human sEcurIty, socIal protEctIon anD safEty nEts, anD fooD anD nutrItIonal sE-
curIty: tHE casE of tHE “gulayan sa paaralan program”, tHE pHIlIppInEs ..............478
Renato Lagapa Base
IncEntIvIsIng smallHolDEr farmEr lIvElIHooDs anD constructIng fooD sEcurIty 
tHrougH HomE-grown scHool fEEDIng:  EvIDEncE from nortHErn gHana ................ 491
Clement Mensah
polIcy coHErEncE In tHE ImplEmEntatIon of tHE 2030 agEnDa for sustaInaBlE DEvElo-
pmEnt: tHE BrazIlIan scHool fEEDIng programmE casE stuDy ..................................506
Mariana Werlang Girardi
doi: 10.5102/rdi.v15i3.5749 Path to judicial activism? The use of “relevant 
rules of international law” by the WTO 
Appellate Body*
Porta para ativismo judicial? O uso de “regras 
pertinentes de direito internacional” pelo 
Órgão de Apelação da OMC
Mariana Clara de Andrade**
AbstrAct
The Appellate Body (AB) of  the World Trade Organization (WTO) is 
currently under the concrete threat of  ceasing its activities in the near fu-
ture. This is the result of  a series of  unaddressed criticisms by some of  the 
members of  the organization, in particular the United States, regarding the 
alleged activist role that the AB has played. These criticisms comprise a 
number of  issues regarding interpretative practices developed by the organ. 
Against this backdrop, the present paper addresses the use of  “relevant rules 
of  international law” which are external to the WTO covered agreements, 
in particular through Article 31(3)(c) of  the Vienna Convention on the Law 
of  Treaties (VCLT), the provision codifying the so-called “principle of  sys-
temic integration”. It studies the reports where reference to this provision 
was made and whether non-WTO rules have been used in an expansive 
or limited way with respect to the mandate of  the AB. It also assesses the 
reception of  these reports by the WTO membership in the meetings of  the 
Dispute Settlement Body. It is concluded that, while recourse to external 
sources under the VCLT provision could represent a potential source of  
expansion of  the AB applicable law in a way that could displease parts of  
the WTO membership, the organ has shifted from a progressive approach, 
which marked the beginning of  its functioning, to a more narrow approach 
of  the applicability of  non-WTO sources in the more recent case law.
Keywords: World Trade Organization; Appellate Body; Judicial Activism; 
Systemic Integration; Vienna Convention on the Law of  Treaties.
resumo
O Órgão de Apelação (OAp) da Organização Mundial do Comércio 
(OMC) está atualmente sob a ameaça de cessar suas atividades em um futu-
ro próximo. Essa situação é resultado de uma série de críticas não resolvidas 
por parte de membros da organização, em particular os Estados Unidos, 
com relação ao papel ativista que o órgão teria desempenhado. Essas críti-
cas incluem questões relativas às práticas interpretativas desenvolvidas pelo 
OAp. Nesse contexto, este artigo analisa o uso de “regras pertinentes de 
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direito internacional” externas aos acordos abrangidos 
da OMC, em particular por meio do Artigo 31(3)(c) 
da Convenção de Viena Sobre o Direito dos Tratados 
(CVDT), o dispositivo que codifica o chamado “prin-
cípio da integração sistêmica”. Este trabalho estuda os 
relatórios do OAp nos quais foi feita referência a esse 
dispositivo, bem como se normas externas à OMC fo-
ram utilizadas de maneira expansiva ou limitada com 
relação ao mandato do mecanismo de solução de litígios 
da organização. Ademais, a recepção desses relatórios 
pelos membros da organização durante as reuniões do 
Órgão de Solução de Controvérsias também é conside-
rada. Conclui-se que, embora recurso a fontes externas 
à OMC por meio do Artigo 31(3)(c) possa representar 
uma fonte potencial de expansão do direito aplicável da 
OAp de modo a desagradar alguns membros da OMC, 
o órgão adotou, em sua jurisprudência mais recente, 
abordagem mais restrita com relação à aplicabilidade de 
normas externas à OMC do que aquela originalmente 
progressiva que marcou os primeiros anos de seu fun-
cionamento.
Palavras-chave: Organização Mundial do Comércio; 
Órgão de Apelação; Ativismo Judicial; Integração Si-
stêmica; Convenção de Viena sobre o Direito dos Tra-
tados.
1. IntroductIon
Several factors explain the undergoing crisis in the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) Appellate Body 
(AB), but some of  them revert to a criticism, most vi-
vidly expressed by the United States, that this organ is 
exercising judicial overreach with respect to the func-
tions it was originally designed to perform.1 
The AB was a late creation of  the Uruguay Round 
negotiations, aimed at counterbalancing the effect that 
the system of  reversed consensus (which amounts to 
a quasi-automaticity of  the adoption of  reports) could 
have had. The idea was to ensure that “bad” panel re-
ports could be reversed.2 The mandate of  panels and 
1  For a detailed account of  the context of  crisis in the WTO 
dispute settlement, see McDOUGALL, Robert. The Crisis in WTO 
Dispute Settlement: Fixing Birth Defects to Restore Balance, Journal 
of  World Trade v. 52, n. 6, p. 867-896, 2018.
2  See STEGER, Debra, The founding of  the Appellate Body. 
In: MARCEAU, Gabrielle (ed). A History of  Law and Lawyers in the 
GATT/WTO: The Development of  the Rule of  Law in the Mul-
the Appellate Body is, however, limited: the Understan-
ding on rules and procedures governing the settlement 
of  disputes (DSU)3 states that the dispute settlement 
system (DSS) “serves to preserve the rights and obliga-
tions of  Members under the covered agreements”, but 
the “rulings of  the DSB cannot add to or diminish the 
rights and obligations provided in the covered agree-
ments”. Furthermore, it only has jurisdiction to assess 
claims which are based on WTO law.
In this context, at the center of  the current crisis is 
the debate of  whether the AB is an international court 
or instead its scope should similar to that of  a contract 
arbitrator.4 Although the two functions may overlap to 
some extent, advocating for the latter in detriment of  
the former means a more limited mandate with respect 
to the interpretation of  WTO provisions.5
In its very first report, the Appellate Body stated 
that the “General Agreement is not to be read in clini-
cal isolation from public international law”.6 This was 
made to justify recourse to the Vienna Convention on 
the Law of  Treaties (VCLT)7 as a reference for the in-
terpretation of  WTO Agreements, but the statement 
tilateral Trading System, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2015. p. 447-465.
3  Understanding on rules and procedures governing the settlement of  disputes 
(DSU), Annex 2 of  the WTO Agreement, available at: https://www.
wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dsu_e.htm. Access in:  05 Dec. 
2018.
4  McDOUGALL, Robert. The Crisis in WTO Dispute Settle-
ment: Fixing Birth Defects to Restore Balance, Journal of  World 
Trade, v. 52, n. 6, 2018, p. 880.
5  This is the position taken by the United States. According 
to the United States Trade Representative (USTR), “The United 
States has been increasingly concerned by the tendency of  WTO 
reports to make findings unnecessary to resolve a dispute or on is-
sues not presented in the dispute. [...] The purpose of  the dispute 
settlement system is not to produce reports or to ‘make law,’ but 
rather to help Members resolve trade disputes among them. WTO 
Members have not given panels or the Appellate Body the power to 
give ‘advisory opinions’ as some national or international tribunals 
have”. (USTR, 2018 Trade Policy Agenda and 2017 Annual Report 
- Chapter I - The President’s Trade Policy Agenda, available at: htt-
ps://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/reports-and-
publications/2018/2018-trade-policy-agenda-and-2017, accessed 
05 December 2018). See, further, Statements by the United States 
at the Meeting of  the WTO Dispute Settlement Body, Geneva, 
November 21, 2018, available at https://geneva.usmission.gov/
wp-content/uploads/sites/290/Nov21.DSB_.Stmt_.as-deliv.fin_.
public.pdf, accessed 05 December 2018.
6  UNITED STATES — Standards for Reformulated and Con-
ventional Gasoline, Appellate Body Report (29 April 1996) WTO Doc 
WT/DS2/AB/R, p. 17.
7  Vienna Convention on the Law of  Treaties (adopted 23 May 
1969, entered into force 27 January 1980) 1155 UNTS 331.
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could be read more broadly.8 Indeed, in US – Shrimp, by 
making wide reference to other sources of  conventional 
international law in its reasoning, the AB gave a clear 
sign that it was willing to make reference to non-WTO 
law, also to shed light on the meaning of  WTO terms 
and provisions.
Against this backdrop, this paper addresses one spe-
cific aspect which could potentially amount to judicial 
activism by the Appellate Body: the use of  other “rele-
vant rules of  international law” and whether recourse 
to VCLT Article 31(3)(c) and the principle of  systemic 
integration broaden the material jurisdiction of  the 
WTO Appellate Body.
Recourse to non-WTO law in WTO dispute set-
tlement can be a source of  judicial overreach for two 
reasons. Firstly, if  the line between interpretation and 
application of  other sources of  law is overstepped, the 
AB may be regarded as enforcing sources of  law which 
fall outside its jurisdiction. Secondly, from a legitima-
cy perspective, a “too systemic” approach to the rela-
tionship between WTO law and general international 
law may displease its members, who may expect the 
WTO DSS to remain within the frame of  the covered 
agreements.
In order to address this question, this paper is di-
vided into three sections. The first section is aimed at 
briefly revisiting the jurisdictional limits of  the WTO 
DSS, as well as explaining the content and scope of  
VCLT Article 31(3)(c) and the so-called principle of  
systemic integration, deemed to have been codified by 
that provision. The second section studies the relevant 
case law of  the Appellate Body in order to assess how 
the organ has interpreted and recurred this provision, 
and to understand whether it has given a broad or nar-
row relevance to other sources of  international law in 
the resolution of  disputes. 
Having this case law in mind, the third section con-
8  James Bacchus, original AB member who drafted the US – 
Gasoline report, recollects: “In the report resulting from the very 
first appeal to the Appellate Body, US – Gasoline, we thought it ap-
propriate, while musing on the meaning of  Article 3.2 of  the DSU, 
to state that this particular provision in the WTO treaty reflects ‘a 
measure of  recognition that the General Agreement is not to be 
read in clinical isolation from public international law’” (BACCHUS, 
James. Not in clinical isolation. In: MARCEAU, Gabrielle (ed.). A 
History of  Law and Lawyers in the GATT/WTO: The Development 
of  the Rule of  Law in the Multilateral Trading System, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2015. p. 508).
siders whether the practice of  the WTO AB relating to 
the use of  Article 31(3)(c) can amount to judicial over-
reach.9 In order to do so, three elements are taken into 
account: the overall trends of  the AB practice invoking 
Article 31(3)(c), the implications such use has had on 
the line between interpretation and application of  other 
rules of  international law, and the manner in which 
WTO members have received AB reports as reflected 
in the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) meetings.
2. the debAte on jurIsdIctIon And ApplIcAble 
lAw And the use of other “relevAnt rules of 
InternAtIonAl lAw”
The controversies surrounding the use of  non-
-WTO law in the dispute settlement of  the multilateral 
trading system can only be grasped after understanding 
the mandate of  the WTO adjudicators. Among other 
elements, this means its material jurisdiction limitations.
The difference between the applicable law (unders-
tood as the sources of  law that can be used in the WTO 
DSS)10 available to the WTO adjudicators and parties 
and its actual jurisdiction (understood as the sources 
which can actually be enforced) has been widely re-
viewed by scholarship.11 Furthermore, Article 3.2 of  the 
9  Judicial activism and overreach are employed interchangeably in 
this work.
10  Marceau observes that part of  the controversy on the limits 
of  applicable law is semantic. Her definition of  “applicable law” is 
the “law for which a breach can lead to actual remedies”, while the 
conception of  the ILC Study Group “includes all legal rules that 
are necessary to provide an effective answer to legal issues raised, 
and it would include procedural-type obligations (like the burden 
of  proof)” (MARCEAU, Gabrielle. Fragmentation in International 
Law: The Relationship between WTO Law and General Interna-
tional Law - A Few Comments from a WTO Perspective. Finnish 
Yearbook of  International Law, v. 7, 2006, p. 6). This article aligns with 
a broader sense of  applicable law – thus, closer to the ILC Study 
Group’s: applicable law here is to be understood as the sources of  
law that can be used by the DS panels and AB to settle a dispute and 
interpret the law that they have actually hold jurisdiction to enforce. 
11  See, inter alia, BARTELS, Lorand. Applicable Law in WTO 
Dispute Settlement Proceedings. Journal of  World Trade, v. 35, n. 
3, p. 499–519, 2001; MARCEAU, Gabrielle, Conflicts of  Norms 
and Conflicts of  Jurisdictions the Relationship between the WTO 
Agreement and MEAs and other Treaties. Journal of  World Trade, v. 
35, n. 6, p. 1081–1131, 2001; PAUWELYN, Joost. Conflict of  Norms 
in Public International Law: How WTO Law Relates to other Rules of  
International Law. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003; 
PALMETER, David; MAVROIDIS, Petros C. The WTO Legal Sys-
tem: Sources of  Law. The American Journal of  International Law, v. 92, 
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DSU provides guidance on this matter. It states:
2. The dispute settlement system of  the WTO 
is a central element in providing security and 
predictability to the multilateral trading system. 
The Members recognize that it serves to preserve 
the rights and obligations of  Members under the 
covered agreements, and to clarify the existing 
provisions of  those agreements in accordance 
with customary rules of  interpretation of  
public international law. Recommendations and 
rulings of  the DSB cannot add to or diminish the 
rights and obligations provided in the covered 
agreements.12
It seems well settled that the WTO DSS has juris-
diction only over matters involving the WTO covered 
agreements,13 while its applicable law can range further 
according to the view one takes as to the material limits 
of  the DSS. The crucial difference would be that panels 
and Appellate Body reports are not authorized to en-
force obligations deriving from external sources. Still, 
the distinction between using such sources as applica-
ble law (for purposes of  “clarifying the existing pro-
visions”) and actually enforcing them (thereby “adding 
to or diminishing the rights and obligations” of  WTO 
members) is not clear-cut. 
The position submitted by the present work sides 
with Marceau’s approach to the problem. She contends 
that
in most cases the proper interpretation of  the 
relevant WTO provisions will be such as to avoid 
conflicts with the other international obligations of  
the WTO Members. [...] In case of  irreconcilable 
conflicts, WTO adjudicating bodies are prohibited, 
through the dispute settlement mechanism and 
while making recommendations to the Dispute 
Settlement Body (DSB), from adding to or 
diminishing the rights and obligations of  WTO.14
She advocates an interpretation of  the WTO rules 
which is consistent with public international law, but 
which at the same time does not promote the enforce-
ment of  external obligations to the detriment of  WTO 
law. The only way these sources can be used would be 
p. 398-413, 1998.
12  Understanding on rules and procedures governing the settlement of  dis-
putes, available at: https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/
dsu_e.htm. Access in: 19 October 2018), emphasis added.
13  These are the WTO Agreement, the Multilateral Trade Agree-
ments of  Annexes 1A, 1B, 1C and 2, and Plurilateral Trade Agree-
ments in Annex 4.
14  MARCEAU, Gabrielle. Conflicts of  Norms and Conflicts of  
Jurisdictions: The Relationship between the WTO Agreement and 
MEAs and other Treaties. Journal of  World Trade, v. 35, n. 6, 2001, p. 
1083.
through WTO provisions.15 One example of  this pos-
sibility would be the use of  the general exceptions of  
Article XX when justified by external treaties and obli-
gations. Another example would be the use of  Conven-
tions that grant waivers in accordance with Article IX 
of  the WTO Agreement. Marceau thus acknowledges 
the importance of  Articles 3.2 of  the DSU and 31 of  
the VCLT, which, “in certain cases requires panels and 
the Appellate Body to use or to take into account va-
rious other treaties, custom and general principles of  
law when interpreting WTO obligations”.16
Article 3.2 is “commonly understood as an invoca-
tion of  the Vienna Convention”.17 Based on this provi-
sion, panels and the AB have justified recourse to the 
rules on interpretation provided by the VCLT.18 In par-
ticular, Article 31(3)(c) of  the Vienna Convention has 
been recognized as customary law.19 As such, it can be 
employed in the WTO dispute settlement mechanism 
for the interpretation of  the covered agreements due 
to the explicit wording of  the DSU stating that “[t]he 
dispute settlement system of  the WTO […] serves to 
[…] clarify the existing provisions of  those agreements 
in accordance with customary rules of  interpretation of  
public international law”.
15  She advances: “The use of  outside law (non-WTO) will de-
pend on the terms of  the WTO provisions at issue. Numerous ref-
erences to outside rules and standards can be found in the WTO 
agreements. ln some cases, the WTO provision should be inter-
preted as requiring the outside obligation to be enforced within the 
WTO system; in others, the outside provision will merely provide 
interpretive material that must be used by WTO adjudicating bodies 
when enforcing another WTO obligation” (MARCEAU, Gabrielle 
Zoe. A call for coherence in international law: praises for the prohi-
bition against ‘Clinical Isolation’ in WTO dispute settlement. Journal 
of  World Trade, v. 33, n. 5, 1999, p. 112, footnotes suppressed).
16  MARCEAU, Gabrielle. Conflicts of  Norms and Conflicts of  
Jurisdictions: The Relationship between the WTO Agreement and 
MEAs and other Treaties. Journal of  World Trade, v. 35, n.6, 2001, p. 
1103.
17  LINDROOS, Anja; MEHLING, Michael. Dispelling the Chi-
mera of  ‘Self-Contained Regimes’ International Law and the WTO. 
European Journal of  International Law, v. 16, n. 5, p. 865, 2006.
18  Isabelle Van Damme explains that “It may be presumed that 
Article 3.2 refers to customary international law on treaty interpreta-
tion as it existed on and evolved after 1 January 1995, which is the 
date of  entry into force of  the covered agreements. The Appellate 
Body confirmed in its first reports that Articles 31 and 32 VCLT 
have attained the status of  ‘customary rules of  interpretation of  
public international law’” (VAN DAMME, Isabelle. Treaty Interpreta-
tion by the WTO Appellate Body, The European Journal of  Interna-
tional Law, v. 21, n. 3, 2010, p. 608, footnotes omitted).
19  MERKOURIS, Panos. Article 31(3)(c) and the Principle of  Systemic 
Integration: Normative Shadows in Plato’s Cave. Brill Nijhoff: 2015. 
p. 4.
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Article 31(3)(c) of  the VCLT forms part of  its gene-
ral rule of  interpretation, which provides:
1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in 
accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given 
to the terms of  the treaty in their context and in the 
light of  its object and purpose.
2. The context for the purpose of  the interpretation 
of  a treaty shall comprise, in addition to the text, 
including its preamble and annexes:
(a) any agreement relating to the treaty which was 
made between all the parties in connexion with the 
conclusion of  the treaty; (b) any instrument which 
was made by one or more parties in connexion with 
the conclusion of  the treaty and accepted by the 
other parties as an instrument related to the treaty.
3. There shall be taken into account, together with 
the context:
(a) any subsequent agreement between the parties 
regarding the interpretation of  the treaty or the 
application of  its provisions; (b) any subsequent 
practice in the application of  the treaty which 
establishes the agreement of  the parties regarding 
its interpretation; (c) any relevant rules of  
international law applicable in the relations between 
the parties.20
At first reading, the meaning of  “context” present 
in Article 31(1) can be misleading. One may think that 
the “context” that should inform the interpretation of  
a treaty is its factual context. Article 31(2) of  the VCLT, 
together with the commentaries of  the International 
Law Commission (ILC), suggests otherwise. In parti-
cular, Article 31(2) states that “The context for the pur-
pose of  the interpretation of  a treaty shall comprise, in 
addition to the text, including its preamble and annexes 
[…]”. The use of  the words “in addition to” implies 
that the context is the text, the preamble and annexes.21
The wording of  this provision may evoke the ques-
tion of  whether the use of  “any relevant rules of  in-
ternational law applicable in the relations between the 
parties” should be taken into account simultaneously 
with the consideration of  the context, or if  instead the 
20  Vienna Convention on the Law of  Treaties (adopted 23 May 1969, 
entered into force 27 January 1980) 1155 UNTS 331, emphasis 
added.
21  This is to be then complemented by “a) any agreement relat-
ing to the treaty which was made between all the parties in connec-
tion with the conclusion of  the treaty; (b) any instrument which was 
made by one or more parties in connection with the conclusion of  
the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an instrument related 
to the treaty”. There does not seem to be, however, any agreement 
or instrument that falls within the definitions of  paragraphs (a) and 
(b) which are relevant for analysis under the present study.
division of  Article 31 into paragraphs indicates some 
kind of  order in the interpretative process.
This question has been recently addressed by the 
ILC on the occasion of  the adoption of  the Draft Con-
clusions on Subsequent agreements and subsequent 
practice in relation to the interpretation of  treaties.22 
Paragraph 5 of  its Conclusion 2 states that “[t]he inter-
pretation of  a treaty consists of  a single combined opera-
tion, which places appropriate emphasis on the various 
means of  interpretation indicated, respectively, in arti-
cles 31 and 32”.23 While not necessarily definitive, this 
paragraph is nonetheless authoritative in shedding light 
on the interpretative process.
Article 31(3)(c) directs a process in which “obliga-
tions are interpreted by reference to their normative en-
vironment (system)”.24 In other words, by determining 
that “any relevant rules of  international law applicable 
between the parties” shall be taken into account “toge-
ther with the context” of  a provision, the drafters of  
the VCLT codified the idea that treaties must be inter-
preted taking into consideration other rules of  interna-
tional law.25
22  General Assembly, Subsequent agreements and subsequent 
practice in relation to the interpretation of  treaties - Text of  the 
draft conclusions adopted by the Drafting Committee on second 
reading, UN Doc A/CN.4/L.907, 11 May 2018.
23  United Nations, Report of  the International Law Commission 
- Seventieth session (30 April–1 June and 2 July–10 August 2018), 
UN Doc A/73/10, p. 13, emphasis added.
24  General Assembly, Fragmentation of  International Law: Diffi-
culties arising from the diversification and expansion of  internation-
al law - Report of  the Study Group of  the International Law Com-
mission, UN Doc A/CN.4/L.682, 13 April 2006, p. 208, para 413.
25  See DÖRR, Oliver. Article 31. General rule of  interpretation. 
In: DÖRR, Oliver; SCHMALENBACH, Kirsten (ed.). Vienna Con-
vention on the Law of  Treaties: A Commentary. Springer, 2018. p. 602-
603. There is some disagreement as to what sources of  law can be 
considered “rules of  international law” for the purposes of  Article 
31(3)(c), in particular whether or not it includes general principles. 
This work supports the view that “rules” comprises treaties, cus-
tomary law and general principles (See MERKOURIS, Panos. Article 
31(3)(c) and the Principle of  Systemic Integration: Normative Shadows in 
Plato’s Cave. Brill Nijhoff: 2015, p. 19 and DÖRR, Oliver. Article 31. 
General rule of  interpretation. In: DÖRR, Oliver; SCHMALEN-
BACH, Kirsten (ed.). Vienna Convention on the Law of  Treaties: A Com-
mentary. Springer, 2018, p. 605). Moreover, in US — Anti-Dumping 
and Countervailing Duties (China), the AB, in assessing the relevance of  
the ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility, stated that while are 
not binding as written rules, but “insofar as they reflect customary 
international law or general principles of  law, these Articles are ap-
plicable in the relations between the parties” (United States - Defini-
tive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain Products 
from China, Appellate Body Report (11 March 2011) WT/DS379/
AB/R, para 308). For a diverging view, see McLACHLAN, Camp-
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The use of  Article 31(3)(c) by international adjudi-
cators can provide a tool against the fragmentation of  
international law.26 McLachlan describes it as a “master 
key” to “all of  the rooms” of  international law, per-
mitting the treaty interpreter to look “outside of  the 
four corners of  a particular treaty to its place in the 
broader framework of  international law […]”.27 Accor-
ding to the author, as well as to the ILC Study Group 
on Fragmentation of  International Law’s final report,28 
Article 31(3)(c) and its codified principle of  systemic 
integration provide an essential toolkit to reducing in-
ternational fragmentation.29
On the other hand, the use of  external sources of  
law in the context of  WTO dispute settlement can con-
flict with the limitations on its mandate. In this vein, the 
question remains as to what extent the WTO DSS has 
recurred to this provision to refer to non-WTO sources 
of  law to guide its interpretative process, and to what 
extent this use has impacted its material jurisdiction.
bell. The Principle of  Systemic Integration and Article, v. 31, n. 3, 
(c) of  the Vienna Convention. The International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly, v. 54, n. 2, p. 290, 2005. VILLIGER, Mark E. Commentary 
on the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of  Treaties. Leiden: Martinus 
Nijhoff  Publishers, 2009. p. 433.
26  See, for instance, the relevance of  the use of  this provision in 
reconciling multilateral environmental agreements and WTO obli-
gations: MOROSINI, Fabio Costa; NIENCHESKI, Luisa Zuardi. 
A relação entre os tratados multilaterais ambientais e os acordos da 
OMC: é possível conciliar o conflito?, Brazilian Journal of  International 
Law, v. 12, n. 2, 2014, p. 156-158.
27  McLACHLAN, Campbell. The Principle of  Systemic Integra-
tion and Article 31(3)(c) of  the Vienna Convention. The International 
and Comparative Law Quarterly, v. 54, n. 2, 2005, p. 281.
28  General Assembly, Fragmentation of  International Law: Dif-
ficulties arising from the diversification and expansion of  interna-
tional law - Report of  the Study Group of  the International Law 
Commission, UN Doc A/CN.4/L.682, 13 April 2006.
29  Chin Leng Lim notes that “This is how the systemic integra-
tion clause is viewed today. It was not always so. In fact, the sys-
temic integration clause was not previously viewed to have been 
concerned with systemic integration at all. Rather, it was viewed as 
an expression of  the doctrine of  inter- temporal law such that the 
words in a treaty might usefully be taken to have been used in the 
sense they bore under the rules of  international law in existence 
at the time the treaty was made, but without ignoring the fact that 
it may be equally useful to have regard to the current state of  the 
law” (LIM, Chin Leng. Trade Law and the Vienna Treaty Conven-
tion’s Systemic Integration Clause. In: CHAISSE, Julien; LIN, Tsai-
yu (eds.), International Economic Law and Governance Essays in Honour 
of  Mitsuo Matsushita, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016. p. 98).
3. the use of ArtIcle 31(3)(c) by the wto 
Ab: cAse studIes 
This section analyzes how the Appellate Body has 
applied Article 31(3)(c) and the principle of  systemic in-
tegration in its case law. Four cases have been selected,30 
and will be addressed in chronological order: US – 
Shrimp (AB report circulated in 1998), US — Anti-
-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China) (March 
2011), EC and certain member States — Large Civil 
Aircraft (May 2011) and Peru – Agricultural Products 
(2015). 
These cases are representative of  the AB’s rulings 
from a temporal perspective, comprising a selection 
from an early report (1998) until a more recent one 
(2015). While some are more thorough than others 
regarding considerations to Article 31(3)(c) and the 
principle of  systemic integration, their combined asses-
sment will provide a general overview of  the subject 
here discussed.
3.1. US – Shrimp
The US – Shrimp report is marked by broad recour-
se to external sources of  international law by the AB. 
In order to shed light on the meaning of  “exhaustible 
natural resources” in GATT Article XX(g), the AB re-
ferenced a number of  other international agreements. 
However, in doing so it made no reference to Article 
31(3)(c), but rather through the “ordinary meaning” of  
the terms in accordance with Article 31(1) of  the VCLT.
The AB did refer to Article 31(3)(c), but in a diffe-
rent context: to invoke the principle of  good faith as 
a general principle of  international law reflected under 
the chapeau of  Article XX. The AB stated that the cha-
30  The reports on which this research focused were select through 
the following method: first, the database used was the WTO website 
and searching for relevant Appellate Body reports (“type of  docu-
ment”) which referred to “relevant rules” and/or “systemic integra-
tion” (“full text search”) (These terms were typed into the “find 
dispute text” section). Following this procedure, 14 Appellate Body 
reports were identified (as of  16 October 2018). However, not all of  
these reports refer to “relevant rules of  international law” as such 
for purposes of  interpretation. Moreover, in some of  these reports, 
reference to “relevant rules” might be only superficial. The second 
step was thus to pinpoint the cases in which Article 31(3)(c) was 
effectively employed and substantive findings this provision were 
drawn. This paper disregards Appellate Body reports under DSU 
Article 21.5 procedures.
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peau was “in fact, but one expression of  good faith”.31 
The VCLT provision was mentioned in a footnote to 
justify the fact that the AB’s task was “to interpret the 
language of  the chapeau, seeking additional interpretati-
ve guidance, as appropriate, from the general principles 
of  international law”.32 
This was the first time the AB referred to Article 
31(3)(c),33 and it is a very limited reference to the pro-
vision. For instance, there is no clarification on why the 
principle of  good faith would be a “relevant rule of  in-
ternational law” for the purposes of  that dispute. There 
is a mere assertion that general principles of  internatio-
nal law can provide guidance and that this is justified by 
Article 31(3)(c).
Moreover, it is interesting to observe how referen-
ce to this provision came up when invoking a general 
principle which was in fact derived from the very text 
of  Article XX (it is an expression of  the chapeau). Con-
versely, the AB did not mention the VCLT provision 
or the principle of  systemic integration when invoking 
other sources of  international law (which also provided 
“additional interpretative guidance”) to interpret the 
meaning of  “exhaustible natural resources”. 
3.2. US — Anti-Dumping and Countervailing 
Duties (China)
In US — Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (Chi-
na), the meaning of  the term “public body” in Article 
1.1(a)(1) of  the Agreement on Subsidies and Counter-
vailing Measures (SCM Agreement) was under dispute.34 
The question was whether state-owned and controlled 
entities should be characterized as public bodies for the 
purposes of  Article 1.1(a)(1) of  the SCM Agreement. 
China invoked the International Law Commission 
31  UNITED STATES — Import Prohibition of  Certain Shrimp 
and Shrimp Products, Appellate Body report (12 October 1998) WT/
DS58/AB/R p. 61, para 158.
32  UNITED STATES — Import Prohibition of  Certain Shrimp 
and Shrimp Products, Appellate Body report (12 October 1998) WT/
DS58/AB/R, p. 61-62, para 158 and footnote 157.
33  Previously, the AB had referred to this provision in Brazil - 
Measures Affecting Desiccated Coconut (WT/DS22/AB/R, p. 8), 
but only when referring to Brazil’s argument regarding the relevance 
of  Article 28 of  the VCLT. The AB did not make further considera-
tions on the matter.
34  The provision states: “1.1 For the purpose of  this Agreement, 
a subsidy shall be deemed to exist if: (a)(1) there is a financial contri-
bution by a government or any public body within the territory of  
a Member (referred to in this Agreement as “government”), […]”.
(ILC) Draft Articles on Responsibility of  States for In-
ternationally Wrongful Acts (DASR), in particular Arti-
cles 4, 5 and 8 (which lay out the rules on attribution of  
conduct to States), as relevant rules that should be taken 
into account for the interpretation of  the provision in 
the sense of  VCLT Article 31(3)(c). 
The Panel in the dispute had considered that, while 
the DASR could be taken into consideration for inter-
pretative purposes, panels and Appellate Body had ac-
cepted them as providing “conceptual guidance only to 
supplement or confirm, but not to replace, the analyses 
based on the ordinary meaning, context and object and 
purpose of  the relevant covered Agreements”.35 The 
Panel dismissed the DASR as “relevant rules of  interna-
tional law” as invoked by China claiming that the WTO 
Agreement should be interpreted “on its own terms, 
i.e., on the basis of  the ordinary meaning of  the ter-
ms of  the treaty in their context […]”, that the DASR 
are not binding and that the WTO rules are lex specialis 
vis-à-vis the general rules of  international law on State 
responsibility.36
The AB ascertained the meaning of  “public body” 
following the steps of  the general rule of  interpretation 
in Article 31 of  the VCLT. After analyzing the “ordi-
nary meaning to be given to the terms of  the treaty in 
their context and in the light of  its object and purpose” 
and motivated by China’s arguments, it considered the 
DASR.
In this dispute, the AB developed a more detailed 
analysis on the applicability of  non-WTO rules invoked 
under Article 31(3)(c) to WTO dispute settlement. It 
stated that the provision “contains three elements. First, 
it refers to ‘rules of  international law’; second, the rules 
must be ‘relevant’; and third, such rules must be ‘ap-
plicable in the relations between the parties’”.37 “Rules 
of  international law”, for the AB, “corresponds to the 
sources of  international law in Article 38(1) of  the Sta-
tute of  the International Court of  Justice and thus in-
cludes customary rules of  international law as well as 
35  UNITED STATES - Definitive Anti-Dumping and Counter-
vailing Duties on Certain Products from China, Panel Report (22 Oc-
tober 2010) WT/DS379/R p. 47, para 8.87.
36  UNITED STATES - Definitive Anti-Dumping and Counter-
vailing Duties on Certain Products from China, Panel Report (22 Oc-
tober 2010) WT/DS379/R p. 48, para 8.87.
37  UNITED STATES - Definitive Anti-Dumping and Counter-
vailing Duties on Certain Products from China, Appellate Body Report 
(11 March 2011) WT/DS379/AB/R, p. 119, para 307.
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general principles of  law”. 38
Thus, the AB hinted it would proceed to assessing 
whether the DASR provisions invoked by China corres-
ponded to “rules of  international” – i.e., customary in-
ternational law or general principles of  law.39 However, 
before even addressing the issue, the AB reasoned that 
its interpretation of  “public body” (based on the ge-
neral rule in VCLT Article 31(1)) “coincide[d] with the 
essence of  Article 5 [of  the DASR]”.40 In other words, 
the AB claimed that Article 5 of  the ILC DASR lent 
support to its own foregoing analysis.41 The AB thus 
circumvented the question of  whether the ILC DASR 
constitute general principles of  law or customary law by 
stating that they “lent support” to its conclusions.
After that, the AB went on to criticize the Panel for 
its statements that the ILC provided mere “conceptual 
guidance” to WTO provisions and thus they did not 
constitute rules of  international law in the sense of  that 
provision. The AB reversed this finding and considered 
that if  ILC Articles have been used to contrast or con-
firm the meaning of  WTO Agreement provisions, “this 
evinces that these ILC Articles have been ‘taken into 
account’ in the sense of  Article 31(3)(c) by panels and 
the Appellate Body in these cases”.42
If  the AB is clearly stating that these Articles have 
been considered in WTO case law through Article 31(3)
(c), it means that it incidentally considers they have at-
tained the status of  customary law or general principle. 
After all, the AB had argued earlier that, to be taken 
into account as a “rule of  international law”, they would 
have to correspond to one of  these sources. However, 
the organ did not explain to what extent the DASR Ar-
ticles reflected customary law or general principles.
Finally, in considering the Panel’s finding that the 
38  UNITED STATES - Definitive Anti-Dumping and Counter-
vailing Duties on Certain Products from China, Appellate Body Report 
(11 March 2011) WT/DS379/AB/R, p. 119, para 308.
39  UNITED STATES - Definitive Anti-Dumping and Counter-
vailing Duties on Certain Products from China, Appellate Body Report 
(11 March 2011) WT/DS379/AB/R, p. 118, para 304 ff.
40  UNITED STATES - Definitive Anti-Dumping and Counter-
vailing Duties on Certain Products from China, Appellate Body Report 
(11 March 2011) WT/DS379/AB/R, p. 120, para 310.
41  UNITED STATES - Definitive Anti-Dumping and Counter-
vailing Duties on Certain Products from China, Appellate Body Report 
(11 March 2011) WT/DS379/AB/R, p. 120, para 311.
42  UNITED STATES - Definitive Anti-Dumping and Counter-
vailing Duties on Certain Products from China, Appellate Body Report 
(11 March 2011) WT/DS379/AB/R, p. 121, para 340.
ILC DASR could not supersede WTO Agreement 
provisions because these constitute lex specialis vis-à-
-vis international law, the AB concluded that there is 
a distinction between taking these Draft Articles into 
account for purposes of  interpretation of  the SCM 
Agreement and applying the Draft Articles. It stressed 
that the provisions being applied were those in the SCM 
Agreement.43
3.3. EC and certain member States — Large Civil 
Aircraft 
In EC and certain member States — Large Civil Aircraft 
(hereinafter, Large Civil Aircraft), the United States had 
brought a dispute to the DSS with regard to certain 
European Union (EU) measures that allegedly consti-
tuted subsidies to the Airbus companies for the develo-
pment of  civil aircraft. In its defense, the EU invoked 
the “Agreement between the European Economic 
Community and the Government of  the United States 
of  America concerning the application of  the GATT 
Agreement on Trade in Civil Aircraft on trade in large 
civil aircraft” (1992 Agreement) as a relevant rule of  
international law, within the meaning of  VCLT Article 
31(3)(c). The EU invoked this provision and referred to 
it as the “principle of  ‘systemic integration’ of  all inter-
national agreements applicable in the parties’ relations 
[…]”.44 
There are two elements worth noting in the Large 
Civil Aircraft AB report. The first one relates to the “rele-
vant rule of  international law” criterion. The AB ultima-
tely did not take the 1992 Agreement into consideration 
because it was deemed not “relevant” within the mea-
ning of  Article 31(3)(c). The AB considered that “[a] 
rule is ‘relevant’ if  it concerns the subject matter of  the 
provision at issue” and, since the 1992 Agreement did 
not specifically relate to the term “benefit” in Article 
1.1(b) of  the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervai-
ling Measures, it could not be considered “relevant”.
The second element is the position the AB took re-
garding the meaning of  the term “applicable in the rela-
tions between the parties” in Article 31(3)(c). In the EC 
43  UNITED STATES - Definitive Anti-Dumping and Counter-
vailing Duties on Certain Products from China, Appellate Body Report 
(11 March 2011) WT/DS379/AB/R, p. 122, para 316.
44  EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES — Measures Affecting Trade 
in Large Civil Aircraft, Appellate Body Report (18 May 2011) WT/
DS316/AB/R, p. 39, para 81.
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– Biotech panel report, which was circulated in 2006 
and was not appealed, the panelists had concluded that 
“the rules of  international law to be taken into account 
in interpreting the WTO agreements at issue in this 
dispute are those which are applicable in the relations 
between [all] the WTO Members”.45 This finding was 
largely criticized by the scholarship,46 and directly chal-
lenged by the European Union in Large Civil Aircraft.47
Before discarding the relevance of  the 1992 Agree-
ment to the dispute, the AB drew considerations on the 
meaning of  the principle of  systemic integration, and 
stated that
in the words of  the ILC, seeks to ensure that 
‘international obligations are interpreted by 
reference to their normative environment’ in a 
manner that gives ‘coherence and meaningfulness’ to 
the process of  legal interpretation. In a multilateral 
context such as the WTO, when recourse is had to 
a non-WTO rule for the purposes of  interpreting 
provisions of  the WTO agreements, a delicate 
balance must be struck between, on the one 
hand, taking due account of  an individual WTO 
Member’s international obligations and, on the 
other hand, ensuring a consistent and harmonious 
approach to the interpretation of  WTO law among 
all WTO Members.48
Albeit subtly, this extract, in highlighting the need to 
take into account “an individual WTO Member’s inter-
national obligations”, represents an implicit overruling 
– or at least a more nuanced approach – of  the EC – 
Biotech panel finding on the matter.49
45  EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES — Measures Affecting the 
Approval and Marketing of  Biotech Products, Panel report (29 Sep-
tember 2006) WT/DS291/R; WT/DS292/R; WT/DS293/R, p. 
333, para 7.68.
46  Most notably, by the Report of  the Study Group of  the In-
ternational Law Commission ‘Fragmentation of  International Law: 
Difficulties arising from the diversification and expansion of  Inter-
national Law (13 April 2006) ILC, 58th session, Geneva, 1 May-9 
June and 3 July-11 August 2006, UN Doc A/CN.4/L.682 227, para 
459 and 237, para 471. See, inter alia, HOWSE, Robert; HORN, 
Henrik, European Communities – Measures Affecting the Approval 
and Marketing of  Biotech Products, World Trade Review, v. 8, n. 1, 
49, 2009; McGRADY, Benn, Fragmentation of  International Law 
or ‘Systemic Integration’ of  Treaty Regimes: EC - Biotech Prod-
ucts and the Proper Interpretation of  Article 31(3)(C) of  the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of  Treaties, Journal of  World Trade, v. 42, n. 
4, pp. 589-618, 2008.
47  EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES — Measures Affecting Trade 
in Large Civil Aircraft, Appellate Body Report (18 May 2011) WT/
DS316/AB/R, p. 39, para 82.
48  EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES — Measures Affecting Trade 
in Large Civil Aircraft, Appellate Body Report (18 May 2011) WT/
DS316/AB/R, p. 363, para 845, footnotes suppressed.
49  Diane Desierto contends that the Appellate Body “[…] sim-
It is telling that the ILC report on fragmentation 
quoted in this extract by the AB had severely criticized 
the interpretation of  the same term of  the provision in 
the EC – Biotech panel report. In other words, the AB 
cited the works of  an institution of  general internatio-
nal law par excellence which criticized a previous WTO 
panel report in order to ground its considerations on 
the provision. One could assume that the AB drew the-
se considerations precisely in order to send the message 
that it was overruling the EC – Biotech panel report.
This is especially so considering that in fact the 
agreement invoked under Article 31(3)(c) was dismis-
sed for not being “relevant”, an assessment that typi-
cally comes before the meaning of  “applicable in the 
relation between the parties”. The AB could, thus, have 
abstained from making any findings relating to this cri-
terion, but instead it chose to make the above quoted 
statements.
3.4. Peru – Agricultural Products
A similar approach to that in Large Civil Aircraft was 
taken in the more recent Peru – Agricultural Products re-
port, in which Peru invoked as part of  its defense ar-
guments Articles 20 and 45 of  the ILC DASR (respec-
tively, provisions on Consent and Loss of  the Right to 
invoke responsibility to the violation of  an international 
obligation). 
The point of  contention was the fact that, in Peru’s 
view, the Free Trade Agreement concluded between the 
disputants modified relevant WTO obligations between 
themselves. Peru argued that the DASR provisions 
on consent and loss of  right to invoke responsibility 
were relevant to the interpretation of  Article 4.2 of  the 
Agreement on Agriculture and Article II:1(b) of  the 
GATT, object of  the dispute, in the terms of  Article 
31(3)(c) of  the VCLT.50
ply took a ‘balancing position’ […]”, but did not “further elaborate 
or develop the practical implementation of  this test, nor show the 
manner by which ‘due account was to be taken of  the non-WTO 
rules, nor elucidate a methodology for achieving harmonization 
in the interpretation of  WTO law in relation to non-WTO rules” 
(DESIERTO, Diane. Public Policy in International Economic Law: the 
ICESCR in trade, finance and investment. Oxford: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 2012. p. 206).
50  “In particular, Peru contends that the both the FTA and the 
ILC Articles are ‘rules of  international law’, that they are ‘applicable’ 
between the parties, that they are ‘relevant’ to the interpretation of  
the above-mentioned WTO provisions, and that ‘parties’ in Article 
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The AB considered that the specific point under 
contention was the assessment of  the nature of  Peru’s 
tariffs, not whether there had been a waiver or a con-
sent to the violation of  relevant WTO provisions. The-
refore, provisions on responsibility of  states were of  
no relevance to the interpretation within the terms of  
Article 31(3)(c).51
Arguably, this very restrictive view may have been 
the rhetorical choice of  the AB to avoid dealing with 
the question whether general rules of  international law 
relating to circumstances precluding wrongfulness and 
state responsibility can be invoked under the multilateral 
trading system as justification for violation of  WTO law.
After assessing these reports, it is worth noting that 
the fact that the AB does not often make explicit refe-
rence to Article 31(3)(c) or the principle of  systemic 
integration does not mean that these have nonetheless 
been employed it in an implicit manner. Indeed, Van 
Damme acknowledges that “Article 31(3)(c) is by no 
means the only principle that can justify treaty interpre-
tation in the light of  international law”.52 
An example is the US – Shrimp report, in which the 
AB confronted several international agreements rele-
vant to the dispute in order to shed light on the mea-
ning of  “exhaustible natural resources”. Notably, it was 
assessing the “ordinary meaning” of  the term by taking 
into consideration other relevant conventions. Still, this 
is nothing less than “taking into account, together with 
the context” of  the GATT, a “relevant rule of  interna-
tional law applicable in the relations between the par-
ties”. Indeed, the AB found it relevant to remark in a 
footnote, the acceptance of  the United Nations Con-
vention on the Law of  the Sea (one of  the conventions 
invoked by the AB) by the parties to the dispute.53
31(3)(c) of  the Vienna Convention should be understood to mean 
the parties to the dispute” (Peru — Additional Duty on Imports 
of  Certain Agricultural Products, Appellate Body report (20 July 2015) 
WT/DS457/AB/R, p. 41 para 5.99).
51  PERU — Additional Duty on Imports of  Certain Agricultural 
Products, Appellate Body report (20 July 2015) WT/DS457/AB/R, 
para 5.91 ff, in particular paras 5.103-5.104.
52  VAN DAMME, Isabelle. Treaty interpretation and the WTO Ap-
pellate Body. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006, p. 375. In the 
same sense, HOWSE, Robert. The use and abuse of  other “relevant 
rules of  international law” in treaty interpretation: insights from 
WTO trade/environment litigation’ IILJ Working Paper, v. 1, 2007.
53  UNITED STATES — Import Prohibition of  Certain Shrimp 
and Shrimp Products, Appellate Body report (12 October 1998) WT/
DS58/AB/R, p. 49, fn 110. For a detailed analysis on why the AB 
may have been preoccupied with demonstrating the acceptance of  
The AB may therefore use the rationale behind the 
principle of  systemic integration without specifically na-
ming it or Article 31(3)(c). However, when it does so, it 
normally refers to Article 31(3)(c) of  the VCLT, as part 
of  the “steps” indicated by the VCLT principles on trea-
ty interpretation. This results in in a reference to non-
-WTO law that is very restrictive, since the methodology 
employed by the AB (and arguably by panels) is that of  
fulfilling the “criteria” to analyze whether a rule can be 
regarded within the scope of  Article 31(3)(c) or not.
4. ImplIcAtIons of the use of ArtIcle 31(3)
(c) to the wto dss: A potentIAl source for 
judIcIAl ActIvIsm?
Judicial activism cannot be defined in an objecti-
ve manner, mostly because “[w]hether something is 
identified as judicial activism […] is often a matter of  
perspective”.54 For the present purposes, three elements 
are taken into consideration to assess whether the re-
course to non-WTO law by means of  Article 31(3)(c) 
amounts to judicial activism: (1) the overall evolution on 
the use of  the VCLT provision by the AB, (2) the use of  
external sources of  law overstepping the line between 
applicable law and jurisdiction and, (3) from a legitima-
cy perspective, the reception of  the reports which were 
analyzed in the previous section by WTO members in 
DSB meetings.
The use of  the principle of  systemic integration and 
Article 31(3)(c), when confronted with the limited ma-
terial jurisdiction of  the WTO AB, entails the question 
of  how the jurisdiction of  the DSS organs could be 
influenced. Through the logic of  systemic integration, 
typically, international adjudicators may invoke sources 
of  law that are not within their jurisdiction in order to 
interpret a provision. The ensuing problem is the blur-
red line between jurisdiction and applicable law.
As demonstrated, the applicability of  Article 31(3)
(c) to WTO dispute settlement was characterized by 
the conventions by the disputants, see HOWSE, Robert. The use 
and abuse of  other “relevant rules of  international law” in treaty in-
terpretation: insights from WTO trade/environment litigation’ IILJ 
Working Paper, v. 1, 2007, p. 14 ff.
54  ZARBIYEV, Fuad. Judicial Activism in International Law: A 
Conceptual Framework for Analysis. Journal of  International Dispute 
Settlement, v. 3, n. 2, 2012. p. 252.
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three criteria in the Large Civil Aircraft AB report: that 
the source being invoked is a rule of  international law; 
that it is a relevant rule; and that it is “applicable in the 
relations between the parties”. 
In Large Civil Aircraft, the AB dismissed the agree-
ment called into question as non-relevant because, al-
though it “relate[d] closely” to the issues of  the dispute,55 
it did inform the meaning of  the specific term “benefit” 
in Article 1.1(b) of  the SCM Agreement. By restricting 
the relevance of  a non-WTO rule to the interpretation 
of  one specific word of  a provision in a covered agree-
ment, the AB adopted a very narrow approach to the 
meaning of  “relevant”. This approach was maintained 
in the case Peru – Agricultural Products. 
Evidently, this is a very restrictive view of  the scope 
of  application of  the principle of  systemic integration. 
The WTO covered agreements are by their very natu-
re very technical and specific regarding their subject 
matter. Few other sources of  law deriving from gene-
ral international law (such as customary rules on state 
responsibility and general principles) will concern the 
same subject matter as WTO provisions. If  one takes 
into consideration the broad use of  written and unwrit-
ten sources of  law made by the AB in the US – Shrimp 
report, one notices a decrease in the range of  possible 
non-WTO law applicable to disputes.
A shift in the use of  Article 31(3)(c) can be obser-
ved when the US – Shrimp report is confronted with 
the Peru – Agricultural products report. In the US – 
Shrimp report the use of  the provision was very loo-
se; the AB provided no explanations to the invocation 
of  the provision and how good faith would fit into it. 
In Howse’s words, perhaps the AB was “making a sta-
tement” regarding the relationship between trade and 
environment, and it chose to refer to other sources of  
conventional law when it could have arrived at the same 
conclusions by referring solely to the preamble and pre-
vious GATT decisions.56
In a subsequent dispute in which the AB recurred 
to Article 31(3)(c), several years later, one can see a 
remarkable contrast: the AB, in US — Anti-Dumping 
55  EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES — Measures Affecting Trade 
in Large Civil Aircraft, Appellate Body Report (18 May 2011) WT/
DS316/AB/R, para 847.
56  HOWSE, Robert. The use and abuse of  other “relevant rules 
of  international law” in treaty interpretation: insights from WTO 
trade/environment litigation, IILJ Working Paper, v. 1, p. 16, 2007.
and Countervailing Duties (China), felt the need to dis-
sect the provision into elements that had to be fulfilled. 
However, even then the threshold for fulfilling these 
criteria was not set high, and the DASR provisions at 
stake were considered “relevant rules of  international 
law applicable … between the parties” without major 
explanations.
Interestingly, the same DASR (albeit different pro-
visions) was discarded as not relevant in the Peru – 
Agricultural report. Had the Anti-Dumping and Coun-
tervailing Duties report been issued more recently, in 
particular having in mind the strict interpretation of  
“relevant” in the Peru – Agricultural report, perhaps it 
would not have passed the “rule of  international law” 
(or even the “relevance”) requirement. Still, the DASR 
could be used for providing interpretative guidance un-
der other “step” of  the VCLT Article 31, such as the 
ordinary meaning.
This strict reliance on the criteria of  Article 31(3)
(c) in order to revert to non-WTO law, in particular its 
focus on the “relevance” criterion, seems to be the line 
the AB drew for the use of  these sources for interpreta-
tive purposes, rather than for its application within the 
DSS, and a sign contrary to judicial activism.
In light of  the Peru – Agricultural products report, the 
test was much stricter than that in US – Shrimp. This can 
be explained by a possible shift in the AB’s perception 
of  its mandate. While in the early years of  its functio-
ning the organ was preoccupied with a “declaration of  
independence”57 and marking itself  as an international 
organ, more recently it may have realized that it has to 
be more WTO-oriented and less expansive for ques-
tions of  internal legitimacy.  The minutes of  meetings 
of  the Dispute Settlement Body in the context of  the 
adoption of  these reports illustrates some of  the Mem-
bers’ perceptions towards the findings relevant to this 
paper.
The use of  other sources of  international law in US 
– Shrimp provided the underpinnings of  the AB’s con-
sideration on the evolutionary nature of  the concept 
of  “exhaustible natural resources”. In the DSB mee-
ting held after the circulation of  the report, the United 
States expressed that it was “pleased that the Appellate 
Body had emphasized that Article XX had to be ‘read 
57  See HOWSE, Robert. The World Trade Organization 20 Years 
On: Global Governance by Judiciary. European Journal of  International 
Law, v. 27, n. 1, p. 9-77, 2016.
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by a treaty interpreter in light of  contemporary con-
cerns of  the community of  nations about the protec-
tion and conservation of  the environment’”.58
On the other hand, this issue was criticized by other 
WTO members. The Philippines, for instance, one of  
the third parties in the dispute, considered that the 
“body of  international treaties did not constitute one 
single code of  conduct, they were instead an accumu-
lation, each treaty separate and independent from the 
other”.59 Thailand, India, Pakistan and the Philippines 
are members with a less political influence than coun-
tries like the United States. Yet, while the United States 
welcomed the approach by the AB in US – Shrimp, it did 
not express the same satisfaction when the AB interpre-
ted the meaning of  “public body” in US – Anti-Dumping 
and Countervailing Duties (China).
When the AB report in US – Anti-Dumping and Coun-
tervailing Duties was circulated, China manifested its ap-
preciation of  the reasoning, “in particular, the Appella-
te Body’s affirmation of  the requirement under Article 
31(3)(c) of  the Vienna Convention to take into account 
relevant rules of  international law as part of  the process 
of  treaty interpretation”.60 The United States, on its side, 
manifested discontent with the report and criticized the 
AB approach.61 While the United States regarded the 
report in general as a “clear case of  overreaching by the 
Appellate body”,62 it did not mention the recourse to 
the ILC DASR in interpreting the term “public body”.
The AB may have relied on the ILC DASR’s rules on 
attribution to determine the meaning of  “public body” 
to a larger extent than what is explicitly in the report. 
However, the rhetoric it used was focused on the prin-
ciples of  interpretation of  Article 31(1) (namely, ordi-
nary meaning in light of  its context and purpose) of  
the VCLT. Indeed, despite the fact that, for instance, 
58  Minutes of  Meeting Held in the Centre William Rappard on 6 
November 1998 (14 December 1998) WTO Doc WT/DSB/M/50, 
p. 11.
59  Minutes of  Meeting Held in the Centre William Rappard on 6 
November 1998 (14 December 1998) WTO Doc WT/DSB/M/50, 
p. 14.
60  Minutes of  Meeting Held in the Centre William Rappard on 
15 March 2011 (9 June 2011) WTO Doc WT/DSB/M/294, p. 17.
61  Minutes of  Meeting Held in the Centre William Rappard on 
15 March 2011 (9 June 2011) WTO Doc WT/DSB/M/294, p.18 ff. 
62  USTR Statement Regarding WTO Appellate Body Report in 
Countervailing Duty Dispute with China, available at: https://ustr.
gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2011/
march/ustr-statement-regarding-wto-appellate-body-report-c, ac-
cessed: 17 October 2018.
Japan criticized the use of  the Draft Articles by the AB 
in this case,63 the United States’ criticism was aimed at 
the substance of  the finding rather than the recourse to 
this source of  law.
The approach of  the AB towards Article 31(3)(c) 
was not discussed in the DSB meetings regarding the 
reports on Large Civil Aircraft nor in Peru – Agricul-
tural Products. Nevertheless, in commenting the latter, 
the United States remarked that, in its reasoning, 
the Appellate Body had refrained from addressing 
certain issues of  interpretation and public 
international law raised by Peru that were not 
necessary to resolve the dispute. This approach had 
allowed the Appellate Body to issue a concise, high-
quality report, and the United States appreciated 
these efforts.64
The United States has arguably adopted a consistent 
position regarding the perhaps expansive role taken by 
the AB in the interpretation of  WTO provisions.65 Yet, 
in US – Shrimp, it did not criticize the progressive ap-
proach taken by the organ; instead, it “welcomed” it. 
The approval of  the United States towards AB reports 
which adopt a cautious (not to say narrow) view with 
relation to “certain issues of  interpretation and public 
international law” is certainly contrasting with its posi-
tion towards the US – Shrimp AB report. 
In any case, the current AB approach lowers the 
chances of  overstepping the line between interpretation 
and application of  other international law within WTO 
dispute settlement. When the AB restricts the relevance 
of  a non-WTO source of  law to a specific expression 
in a WTO Agreement, and when it takes such a narrow 
approach to what can be considered ‘relevant’ in this 
sense, it is very unlikely that it will overreach its manda-
te by applying, in the WTO context, sources which are 
not part of  the multilateral trading system. 
On the other hand, the overreach in the use of  non-
-WTO law may appear when the AB invokes it to clarify 
the meaning of  WTO provisions, as seen in US – Anti-
-dumping and Countervailing Duties (China). However, 
63  Minutes of  Meeting Held in the Centre William Rappard on 25 
March 2011 (9 June 2011) WTO Doc WT/DSB/M/294 27.
64  Minutes of  Meeting Held in the Centre William Rappard on 
31 July 2015 (25 September 2015) WTO Doc WT/DSB/M/366 3.
65  For a detailed analysis of  the criticisms addressed by the Unites 
States towards the AB alleged judicial overreach since the early years 
of  its functioning, see McDOUGALL, Robert. The Crisis in WTO 
Dispute Settlement: Fixing Birth Defects to Restore Balance, Journal 
of  World Trade v. 52, n. 6, p. 867-896, 2008.
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since this report, the AB seems to have taken a stric-
ter approach towards the possibility of  invoking these 
sources. Moreover, this is a general problem of  inter-
pretation, not just one linked to the recourse to other 
sources of  international law.
There is a final element worth remarking, which 
relates to what the United States calls “Issuing Advi-
sory Opinions on Issues Not Necessary to Resolve a 
Dispute”.66 This practice can be seen in US — Anti-
-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China), Large 
Civil Aircraft and Peru – Agricultural Products.
In Countervailing Duties, the AB tried to circumvent 
addressing the status of  the DASR as rules of  interna-
tional law, but eventually implicitly did so by correcting 
the Panel’s findings on the matter. One can argue that, 
having ascertained the meaning of  “public body”, the 
AB could have concluded the analysis and not touched 
upon the question of  whether the DASR is to be consi-
dered a “relevant rule of  international law applicable in 
the relations between the parties”.
In Large Civil Aircraft, the AB did not have to make 
considerations regarding the meaning of  “the parties” 
in Article 31(3)(c) since it ultimately dismissed the appli-
cability of  the 1992 Agreement invoked for being “not 
relevant”. Still, it drew conclusions that clearly stated its 
disagreement with the findings regarding the same issue 
in the EC – Biotech panel report. 
In Peru – Agricultural products, the AB could have 
dismissed the allegations regarding the relevance of  the 
free trade agreement on the basis that the treaty was not 
in force between the parties. It did not do so, and went 
on to analyze specific aspects of  its applicability. 
Therefore, it seems that the AB makes statements 
which are unnecessary to reach the same conclusion, but 
which are necessary to “send messages” through obiter 
dicta to its membership.67 In this sense, the jurisdictio-
nal constraints of  the AB may not be as narrow as they 
seem at first sight when it comes to interpreting Article 
66  USTR, 2018 Trade Policy Agenda and 2017 Annual Report 
- Chapter I - The President’s Trade Policy Agenda, available at: htt-
ps://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/reports-and-
publications/2018/2018-trade-policy-agenda-and-2017, accessed 
05 December 2018.
67  For a discussion on obiter dicta and the AB, see GAO, Henry. 
Dictum on Dicta: Obiter Dicta in WTO Disputes. World Trade Re-
view, 2018, v. 17, n. 3. pp. 509–533 and SACERDOTI, Giorgio. A 
Comment on Henry Gao, ‘Dictum on Dicta: Obiter Dicta in WTO 
Disputes’. World Trade Review, v. 17, n. 3. p. 535–540, 2018.
31(3)(c). Whether this is a positive or negative take by 
the organ depends on one’s view of  its judicial function.
5. conclusIon
This paper addressed one element among several 
which may have contributed to the criticisms directed 
at the role played by the Appellate Body in its functio-
ning: the use of  VCLT Article 31(3)(c) and the refe-
rence to non-WTO sources of  law for the interpreta-
tion of  WTO obligations through this provision and 
the principle of  systemic integration. While this specific 
interpretative tool has not been an object of  direct criti-
cism, the way in which the AB refers to other “relevant 
sources of  international law” could give rise to claims 
of  judicial activism.
Three main conclusions can be drawn from the 
practice of  the AB with regard to its use of  Article 
31(3)(c) and the principle of  systemic integration. First, 
it opts to refer to the codified provision rather than to 
the principle of  systemic integration. The long-standing 
“tradition” of  following the codified rules on treaty in-
terpretation in the resolution of  the disputes and the 
“authorization” granted by DSU Article 3.2 to invoke 
to customary rules on treaty interpretation can explain 
why AB, panels and parties have preferred to invoke 
Article 31(3)(c) of  the VCLT rather than the principle 
of  systemic integration. These reasons enhance the le-
gitimacy of  resorting to this mechanism for taking into 
account non-WTO rules.
This consideration is bolstered by the second con-
clusion: the approach of  the AB towards Article 31(3)
(c) has shifted from a very broad one, in US – Shrimp, to 
a strict one, as seen in particular in the Peru – Agricultural 
products dispute. The AB, in its more recent case law, de-
veloped a very strict benchmark for assessing whether 
a rule of  international law is “relevant” for interpreting 
WTO terms and provisions.
The third conclusion flows from the foregoing two: 
the current AB approach on the use of  Article 31(3)(c) 
does not in fact promote systemic integration. While the 
interpretative practices of  the AB in general fall outside 
the scope of  the present paper – for instance, to what 
extent the interpretation of  the term “public body” 
amounted to judicial overreach –, it is apparent from 
the analysis advanced here that the tendency to invoke 
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non-WTO law by the AB is becoming less frequent. In 
fact, a very limited role has been given to general inter-
national law sources in the interpretation of  the covered 
agreements, in particular by means of  Article 31(3)(c).
The more deferential approach adopted by the AB 
in more recent case law, in contrast with the more li-
beral one in US – Shrimp, may have been a response 
to the criticisms which now threaten its very existen-
ce. Systemic interpretation is no longer at the center of  
the debate; now, there must be a compromise between 
tackling vague-worded provisions and its own internal 
legitimacy.
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